The Official Journal of the European Union has published a summary of the non-confidential documents related to the operation of concentration between Nokia and Navteq, which was found to be compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement by Commission Decision on July 2nd, 2008.

On October 1st 2007, Nokia announced the signing of an agreement according to which Nokia will acquire all shares and outstanding options in Navteq. The transaction constituted a concentration within the meaning of Article 3.1 b) of Regulation (EC) Nº 139/2004 (the ‘Merger Regulation’).

Following to this announcement, the Commission decided on March, 28th 2008 to initiate proceedings in such case, given that this concentration might raise some concerns about its compatibility with the Common Market. Furthermore, the Advisory Committee agreed with the Commission in its Opinion, that this operation was a vertical merger and identified the following relevant product markets:

• Navigable Digital Map Databases — Upstream market.
• Navigation Software — Intermediate market.
• Navigation Applications for Mobile Handsets — Downstream market I.
• Mobile Handsets — Downstream market II.

The Commission authorised on May, 14th 2008 the acquisition without commitments by TomTom of Tele Atlas, the competitor of Navteq in the supply of navigable digital map databases. Although the merger between Nokia and Navteq is analysed independently and presents different characteristics — in particular in the downstream markets — a number of similarities exist between the two cases. The analysis in both cases shows that vertical foreclosure is unlikely because the newly merged entity would lack the incentive to foreclose.

The Commission has focused its market investigation on assessing the likelihood of competitive harm arising as a result of the transaction due to:

1. Non-coordinated effects (input foreclosure by the merged entity in the downstream markets; and access by the merged entity to confidential information of its competitors).
2. Coordinated effects.

The Commission also examined whether the vertical integration of Nokia and Navteq would create any concerns as regards coordinated effects, and found that the transaction is unlikely to lead to anticompetitive effects through coordination for the reasons explained below.

The Commission concluded that the concentration will not give raise to any competition concerns as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it. Consequently, the Commission declared the concentration compatible with the Common Market and the EEA Agreement.